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THEODORE R. KUPTERMAN*

OPINION
SUPREME COURT : NEW YORK COUNTY
SPECIAL TERM : PART I
M. WIEL, Administrateur Provisoire for
the Estate of Marie Josephine Parrot de
Guigne, deceased,
Plaintiff,
- against -

Index No.
7210/69

CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT &
MOSLE, a partnership,t
Defendant.
KUPTERMAN, J.:
Plaintiff brought these actions in replevin, one as Administrateur Provisoire of the Estate of Phillippe de Tristan, deceased, and one as Administrateur Provisoire of the Estate of said decedent's wife, Marie Josephine
Parrot de Guigne, deceased, to recover possession of files in the possession
of the defendant law firm, maintained by it as attorneys for the two
decedents during their lifetimes.
From the papers and documents submitted, it appears that Phillippe de
Tristan, a citizen and domiciliary of France, died on November 1, 1955.
By order of the President of the Tribunal of Seine (now the Paris Court of
High Instance), dated May 2, 1958, following a hearing at which all heirs
of the estate were represented by counsel, plaintiff was appointed to supervise the administration of the Estate of Phillippe de Tristan, then being
conducted by the decedent's widow, Madame de Tristan (nee Marie Josephine Parrot de Guigne), as one of the heirs. By this order plaintiff was
given the power and duty "to search by all appropriate means the various
items of property located in France and abroad, to cause to be released to
him by all parties concerned all information and documents related to the
estate."
*Judge, First Judicial District, Supreme Court of New York.
tThis opinion is published herein because of its general interest to international lawyers.
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On appeal to 1st Chamber of the Paris Court of Appeals and by its
decree dated November 10, 1958, the Court found that the powers originally granted to plaintiff were inadequate and it broadened his appointment
and powers. By its decree plaintiff was appointed "Administrateur Provisoire of the Estate of Phillippe de Tristan, this with the broadest powers,"
thus superseding administration of the estate by any of the heirs. On
further appeal the decree was confirmed by decree of the Court de Cassation, the highest Court in France, dated January 19, 1960.
The widow, Madame de Tristan, who was also a citizen and domiciliary
of France, died on January 7, 1965. By decree of the 1st Chamber of the
Paris Court of Appeals dated May 3, 1965, following a hearing at which all
of the heirs were represented by counsel, plaintiff was appointed Administrateur Provisoire of the joint property of Mr. and Madame de Tristan with
the power and duty, among others, "to have made available to him by any
persons, companies, holding companies, banks, credit companies or establishments, in France as well as in foreign countries, any documents which
may establish the origin of said properties." By further decree of the 1st
Chamber of the Paris Court of Appeals, dated May 11, 1967, plaintiff was
further appointed Administrateur Provisoire of the Estate of Madame de
Tristan, superseding a previously appointed administrator, with the power
and duty to "seek after the properties which constitute this succession, to
seize them, and to manage them for the account of whomever will be
concerned."
All of plaintiff's appointments have been renewed by Court order each
year following hearings at which all of the heirs of the estate have been
represented by counsel. In the last order of reappointment, which relates to
both estates, the Court refers in its findings to the present litigation instituted by plaintiff in the New York Courts as one of the reasons for
renewing plaintiff's appointments.
These motions by the defendant to dismiss the complaints are made on
the ground, as a matter of law, that plaintiff as the appointee of the Court of
a foreign country, to wit, the Republic of France, has no standing and legal
capacity to bring this action, that pursuant to the terms of his appointment
and the laws of France, he is not empowered to bring this action and that
the cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, CPLR, Section
214(3), which provides that an action for the recovery of a chattel must be
brought within three years. In its answer the defendant asserts two additional defenses: (1) that plaintiff's right to possession of the files is barred
by the attorney-client privilege under New' York law, and (2) that
plaintiff's right to possession of the files is barred by the French privilege
governing communications with French lawyers.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2

M. Wiel. v. Curtis et al.

267

The argument of the movant to the effect that the plaintiff and/or the
relatives having had some knowledge of the lawyer-client relationship
between the decedents and their American counsel, caused the Statute of
Limitations to run cannot be accepted in the situation presented here.
The defendant law firm was lawfully in possession of the files relating to
its clients as custodian for the benefit of the clients and their estates and
the defendant was not under any obligation to turn the files over to the
clients or to the administrator of their estates at any fixed time or upon any
fixed contingency unless and until instructed to do so by the clients or,
after their death, by the administrator of their estates. Thus, no wrong had
been committed by the defendant until plaintiff demanded the files on or
about February 17, 1969. When the defendant refused to comply with the
demand, a cause of action for either conversion or replevin accrued. See
People, ex rel Bailey v. The Judges of the Albany Mayor's Court, 9 Wend.
486, 480-491 (Supreme Court of Judicature, 1833).
With respect to the standing of the plaintiff as a foreign representative
to sue, the general common law rule is, of course, that a foreign representative has no standing to sue in New York in his representative
capacity. However, it is well settled that a foreign representative is and
always has been entitled to sue in the New York Courts when the suit
could properly be brought in his individual capacity. As stated in
McKinney's commentary to Section 13-3.5 of the Estates, Powers and
Trust Law, Vol. 17B, page 420:
Of course the common law rule had no proper application when the foreign
representative sued in our courts in his individual,as opposed to his representative capacity. Such suits have been traditionally allowed. (see, Johnson'v.
Wallis, 1889, 112 N. Y. 230, 19 N.E. 653.
The law as to when an executor or administrator must sue in his
representative capacity as distinguished from when he may properly sue in
his individual capacity is clear in New York. The test is whether the cause
of action accrued before or after the death of the testator. Obviously here
the cause of action accrued after the deaths of both testators and therefore
the plaintiff is within his rights to carry on the instant suit. This is particularly so since the suit is only nominally for property and therefore there is
no danger of plaintiff, a foreign representative, securing property of value
and removing such property from the jurisdiction of the Court and thus
depriving creditors of their rights. In addition, at this time there is no
evidence of any property of the decedents being within the State of New
York.
On the entire submission it appears that the plaintiff has a right to
examine the files maintained by the defendant law firm and that making
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them available to the plaintiff will not in any wise cause the defendant law
firm or any of its members to violate law or ethics. The rights of other heirs
of the decedents are not violated by such turnover, nor are they asserted
except by inference. That the results of the investigation may be used in
law suits in France does not militate against this determination.
Accordingly, the motions of the defendant to dismiss the complaints are
denied, and the cross motions of the plaintiff for the relief demanded in the
complaint is granted, limited, however, to those files which decedents
themselves could have demanded.
Dated:
December 7th, 1970
J. S. C.
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